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DRAWING THE LINE: REFINING THE BAKER HUGHES
BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK FOR VERTICAL MERGERS
Matthew J. Ossorio*
Abstract
This Note both analyzes the problems that vertical mergers present in
antitrust law and explores solutions to combat the difficulties
enforcement agencies and merging entities face during injunctive relief
proceedings. This Note was written to edify practitioners in both antitrust
law and unrelated specialties. Although the goal of antitrust enforcement
is the protection of competition, not competitors, vertical mergers pose a
unique challenge for antitrust practitioners and enforcement agencies
when they attempt to persuade a court of the proposed merger’s
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. This is because vertical
mergers do not inherently result in the elimination of competition. To
better understand why some vertical mergers are challenged, this Note
engages in a comprehensive exploration of vertical mergers themselves;
their history within antitrust law; and their potential for producing
economic benefits or harms. This understanding lays the foundation for
tackling the overarching problem that appeared in the U.S District Court
for the District of Columbia’s 2018 opinion of United States v. AT&T,
Inc.: a lack of specifics on the types of evidence that will satisfy each
party’s burden under the Baker Hughes framework.
To address this problem, this Note investigates the Baker Hughes
burden-shifting framework used to analyze vertical mergers to find what
is both unclear and what can be improved. From there, this Note draws
from three burden-shifting frameworks outside of antitrust law to find
commonalities with the Baker Hughes framework: a novel contribution
to vertical merger analysis. These common elements are incorporated into
this Note’s proposed solutions: detailing the specific evidence that both
parties can introduce to satisfy their respective burdens and establishing
a definite articulation of the government’s burden of persuasion in
vertical merger cases as satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence
standard. This Note’s attempt to fill in the Baker Hughes framework’s
missing gaps will hopefully propel antitrust law forward into a new era
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of vertical merger enforcement that results in more equitable and
evenhanded decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
In general, mergers are challenged prior to their occurrence; as such,
there is no proof that competitive harm has occurred, but there is fear that
it might occur.1 Vertical mergers are mergers “that combine firms or
assets at different stages of the same supply chain”2 for the purpose of
1. Hebert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 583, 610 (2018).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2020) [hereinafter
VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/usdepartment-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-
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harnessing the efficiencies of organized production that emerge from
coordination as a single business entity.3 Factors like higher prices,
reduced quality, or reduced output are used to analyze a proposed
merger’s potential for anticompetitive harm.4 Vertical mergers are
difficult to challenge because they do not inherently result in the
elimination of competition.5 In the majority of challenged merger cases,
courts have approved vertical mergers because their “anticompetitive
effects are outweighed by potential efficiencies or because there are no
anticompetitive effects.”6
Antitrust law policy is far from optimal because it analyzes proposed
mergers that are approved without a record of anticompetitive effects.7 In
the first litigated vertical merger case in forty years,8 United States v.
AT&T, Inc.,9 the burden-shifting framework used to evaluate vertical
mergers’ predicted harm was applied in an unclear, inconsistent manner
that may potentially result in subsequent divergent outcomes.10 AT&T,
Inc. is significant for being one of the most recent precedents on vertical
mergers and for highlighting the need for a more definite application of

guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CY2-V3PB]. Examples of
vertical mergers include a manufacturer acquiring one of the firms that supplies it with parts, or a
retail chain buying the manufacturer of one of the consumer products that it sells. Id. at 3, 11; see
also id. at 1 n.1 (mentioning that “[t]hese Guidelines supersede the extant portions of the
Department of Justice’s 1984 Merger Guidelines” to reflect the “ongoing accumulation of
experience at the Agencies” and that “[t]hese Guidelines may be revised from time to time as
necessary . . . to reflect new learning”).
3. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Economists, Antitrust Scholars, and Former Government
Antitrust Officials in Support of Appellees and Supporting Affirmance at 5, United States v.
AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5214), 2018 WL 4628092, at *5. See
generally George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J.
POL. ECON. 185 (1951) (applying economic theory to vertical integration).
4. Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining Acquisitions of Nascent or
Potential Competitors by Digital Platforms Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Pol’y
& Consumer Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 5 (2019) (statement of the Federal
Trade Commission), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2019/09/prepared-statement-federaltrade-commission-competition-digital-technology [https://perma.cc/K8D5-5UQ9].
5. See James A. Keyte, The AT&T/Time Warner Decision: More Than Meets the Eye,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2019, at 20, 22.
6. D. Daniel Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1357,
1364 (2018); see James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, Getting Vertical Deals Through the
Agencies: “Let’s Make a Deal,” ANTITRUST, Summer 2015, at 10, 11–12; Paul Yde, NonHorizontal Merger Guidelines: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 74,
81.
7. Sokol, supra note 6, at 1360–61 (discussing the analytical obstacles to overcome and
inferential steps required to create an optimal vertical merger policy).
8. See Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Mergers: Recent
Developments and Economic Teachings, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2019, at 1, 2.
9. 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
10. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
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the Baker Hughes burden-shifting framework.11 In response, this Note
engages in a multi-disciplinary approach to find the commonalities in
burden-shifting frameworks available in other areas of the law. Based on
these observed commonalities, this Note suggests two proposals that
antitrust law can incorporate into the burden-shifting framework to better
apply and analyze the harm that a fraction of proposed vertical mergers
are likely to pose: (1) detailing the specific evidence parties can present
to satisfy their respective burdens and (2) establishing a definite
articulation of the government’s burden of persuasion as satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence standard (instead of described in general
terms).
To begin, Part I provides a brief overview of antitrust law and policy.
Part II then discusses the results of empirical evidence on vertical
mergers, provides an overview of the economic benefits and harms of
vertical mergers, and analyzes the seminal vertical merger cases,
including AT&T, Inc. Next, Part III examines comparable burden-shifting
frameworks, similar to the Baker Hughes framework, in four areas
outside of antitrust law and resolves a perceived error in AT&T, Inc.
Practical takeaways from the analogous frameworks are incorporated into
the suggested proposals found in Part IV. Finally, Part IV concludes by
suggesting the addition of an initial procompetitive presumption if the
challenged merger meets certain conditions, identifying the evidentiary
standard each party must meet to satisfy its burden, and discussing the
types of evidence each party may present to do so.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust law’s dislike of mergers has a long history, and today’s
courts analyze mergers under a rule of reason approach.12 Two salient
11. The framework is named after the case United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d
981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
12. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, arguably the first U.S. Supreme Court decision
on mergers, involved two competing railroad companies whose major stockholders had agreed to
merge their interests by creating the Northern Securities Company and transferring their stock to
its control. 193 U.S. 197, 320–22 (1904). Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan concluded that
Congress had the same power, as did the states, to regulate combinations between private parties
that restrain interstate commerce under the Sherman Act, i.e., mergers. Id. at 338–45. Notably,
Justice Brewer’s concurrence influenced the Court’s subsequent merger cases by articulating the
idea that mergers should be evaluated under a rule of reason approach. See id. at 361 (Brewer, J.,
concurring) (“Instead of holding that the Anti-Trust Act included all contracts, reasonable or
unreasonable, in restraint of interstate trade, the ruling should have been that the contracts there
presented were unreasonable restraints of interstate trade, and as such within the scope of the
act. . . . The purpose [of the act] rather was to place a statutory prohibition with prescribed
penalties and remedies upon those contracts which were in direct restraint of trade, unreasonable
and against public policy.”). Under the rule of reason approach, “the factfinder weighs all of the
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federal statutes applied to the analysis of vertical mergers are the Clayton
Antitrust Act of 191413 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act).14 The Clayton Act was passed as
a preventative measure to combat the growing power of trusts for
consolidating corporate monopolies. The Clayton Act also served as a
check on the effects of anticompetitive acts, such as mergers, before they
reached the level of a violation.15 After being amended in 1950 by the
Celler-Kefauver Act,16 Section 7 of the Clayton Act was textually
expanded to cover all mergers, including vertical ones.17
The legal standard set forth by Section 7 of the Clayton Act for
rejecting proposed mergers is whether the effects of the merger “may be
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing
an unreasonable restraint on competition.” Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49 (1977). This approach stands in stark contrast to per se rules of illegality. The Court explained,

Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct
that is manifestly anticompetitive. As the Court explained in Northern
Pac. R. Co. . . . “there are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use.”
Id. at 49–50 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
13. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(b)(1)–(2) (empowering the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) with the authority to review mergers required to be reported prior to completion); id.
§ 21(a)–(b) (granting the FTC the authority to review mergers that would substantially lessen
competition via adjudication); id. § 25 (granting the DOJ the authority to seek preliminary and
permanent injunctions of mergers before their completion before a federal court). The FTC Act,
while also relevant to merger enforcement, will not be the focus of this Note. See Federal Trade
Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58).
However, for more information on how it applies to the analysis of vertical mergers, see
KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44971, PRE-MERGER REVIEW AND CHALLENGES
UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT 1–2 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44971.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8GV-D5YR].
14. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c–15h, 18a,
66).
15. United States v. Koppers Co., 202 F. Supp. 437, 439–40 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (discussing
the legislative history of the Clayton Act).
16. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). In 1980, Congress amended the statute to include
mergers by non-corporate entities and acquisitions in or “affecting commerce.” Antitrust
Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1154, 1157–58
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18).
17. Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and
Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2018 (2018); see United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957) (mentioning that Congress’ revisions to the Clayton Act were
made in an effort to “make it clear” that the enforcement agencies had the authority to challenge
anticompetitive vertical mergers under § 7 of the Act (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 81-1191, at 11
(1950))).
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to substantially lessen competition” or to “tend to create a monopoly.”18
Thus, a showing of the reasonable probability of a vertical merger’s
substantial anticompetitive effects may be enough to block the merger.19
Section 7 changed the time horizon of analysis20 for assessing the
anticompetitive harm of vertical mergers by introducing the
“incipiency”21 doctrine, whereby reviewing courts analyze proposed
mergers “before the harm they threaten is achieved.”22 Section 7’s
incipiency standard allows vertical mergers “to be prohibited on proof of
probable anticompetitive effects, as opposed to actual anticompetitive
effects.”23
While the Clayton Act does not define the term “lessened
competition,” the Horizontal Merger Guidelines clearly define
competitive harm in terms of mergers as “encourag[ing] one or more
firms to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise
harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or
incentives.”24 And although the Clayton Act does not provide a test to
measure when competition has decreased as a result of a merger, caselaw
has filled in some of the blanks.25 For a multitude of reasons, including
to allow the enforcement agencies “to prevent interim harm to
competition and consumers,”26 Congress enacted the HSR Act.27
In general, the HSR Act requires that certain “proposed acquisitions
of voting securities, non-corporate interests, or assets be reported to the
18. § 7, 38 Stat. at 731–32; Larry Bumgardner, AT&T & Time Warner’s Vertical Merger:
The Court Battle and Political Undercurrent, J.L. BUS. & ETHICS, Winter 2019, at 31, 39.
19. Bumgardner, supra note 18, at 39.
20. Richard M. Steuer, Incipiency, 31 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 155, 160 (2019). The
incipiency test requires a prediction of a merger’s “impact upon competitive conditions in the
future.” United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
21. United States v. Koppers Co., 202 F. Supp. 437, 439–40 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (referring to
the Senate Committee Report that supported the idea that the bill would not apply to the mere
possibility but only to the reasonable probability of the prescribed effect).
22. Steuer, supra note 20, at 157 (emphasis added).
23. Sean P. Sullivan, What Structural Presumption?: Reuniting Evidence and Economics
on the Role of Market Concentration in Horizontal Merger Analysis, 42 J. CORP. L. 403, 408 n.11
(2016); see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). In other words, Section
7 of the Clayton Act requires a prediction of a merger’s “impact upon competitive conditions in
the future.” United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966) (quoting Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. at 362).
24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2 (2010) [hereinafter
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines08192010 [https://perma.cc/WK59-UDA4].
25. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 87 (2018).
26. JOSEPH J. SIMONS & MAKAN DELRAHIM, FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., HART-SCOTTRODINO ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2019), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/annualcompetition-reports [https://perma.cc/T8BJ-9X4C].
27. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c–15h, 18a,
66).
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[Federal Trade] Commission and the Antitrust Division” prior to their
effectuation.28 The purpose of the HSR Act’s Pre-Review process is to
give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of
Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) (collectively, the Agencies) the time and
information necessary to review mergers and acquisitions for potential
anticompetitive concerns.29 This process requires the merging parties to
fill out the HSR form and disclose certain nonpublic information.30
Disclosure of this type of information remains confidential and can only
be disclosed to the public in the course of either an administrative or
judicial proceeding.31 Procedurally, one of the Agencies will obtain
clearance from the other to begin its investigation into the proposed
merger; if both agencies request clearance, then the agency with the most
expertise in reviewing transactions in the relevant market(s) will conduct
the investigation (subject to jurisdictional limitations).32
The merging parties must then wait a specified period, between fifteen
to thirty days, before they may complete the proposed merger.33 Before
the waiting period expires, the reviewing agency can either decide to
issue a request for more information or allow the transaction to complete
itself.34 When the reviewing agency decides within the thirty-day waiting
period that further inquiry is necessary (usually because of unresolved
anticompetitive concerns), it is allowed to issue what is called a Second
Request, i.e., a request for more documentary material and additional
information from the merging parties.35 For the purposes of this Second
Request, the investigating agency may gather evidence from others apart
from the merging parties, such as market participants and academics.36
Once the parties have complied substantially with the Second Request,
the reviewing agency has approximately thirty days to decide on how to
proceed.37 If the parties fail to comply substantially with the Second
28. SIMONS & DELRAHIM, supra note 26, at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id. The types of nonpublic information that the parties must provide include: “(1)
information about themselves, including their balance sheets; (2) information related to the
proposed transaction’s planning and execution; and (3) information regarding the product, service,
and geographic markets in which they operate.” RUANE, supra note 13, at 3.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h).
32. RUANE, supra note 13, at 3–4.
33. 15 U.S.C § 18a(b)(1).
34. See id. § 18a(b)(2). The transaction can be completed by the Agency terminating the
waiting period early or letting the waiting period expire without taking further action. RUANE,
supra note 13, at 4.
35. See § 18a(e)(1)(a).
36. Id.; see VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 3 (“The sources of evidence on
which the Agencies rely are the same as those set forth in Section 2.2 of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and include documents and statements of the merging parties, their customers, and
other industry participants and observers.”).
37. § 18a(e)(2).
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Request, the reviewing agency may request a federal district court to
order the parties to comply.38 If the waiting period expires, the parties are
allowed to complete the merger transaction.39
If the agency decides to challenge a proposed merger, it will do so in
one of two ways. First, the agency may negotiate a consent agreement
with the parties allowing the transaction to complete itself under
conditions that alleviate anticompetitive concerns.40 Second, the agency
may attempt to block the merger entirely by either petitioning a court for
injunctive relief or through administrative litigation.41 Whether a
particular transaction is subject to the HSR’s reporting requirements
depends on various factors, including the value of the acquisition and the
size of the parties as measured by their sales and assets.42 Because these
thresholds are adjusted, based on the 2000 Amendments to the HSR
Act,43 the FTC publishes revised thresholds on a periodic basis. On
March 4, 2019, the FTC published a notice44 to reflect adjustment of the
reporting thresholds that included (among other revisions) the size of
transaction threshold rising to $90 million.45
II. ANTITRUST LAW AND VERTICAL MERGERS
The overarching theoretical goal of merger enforcement policy in
antitrust law is to promote competition, even if larger, more efficient
business firms win the competitive battle against smaller, less efficient
firms.46 In practice, merger policy has been adopted to promote
competition through application of the consumer welfare standard by
“protecting consumers against high prices or reduced output, product
38. Id. § 18a(e)(2), (g)(2)(A).
39. RUANE, supra note 13, at 5.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (allowing the entry of consent judgments in a civil proceeding
brought by the federal government under the antitrust laws).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(B), (b) (authorizing the federal government to undertake
administrative proceedings to, e.g., enjoin or dissolve a proposed merger); see 15 U.S.C. § 25
(granting the Department of Justice the authority to institute preliminary injunctive proceedings
to restrain violations of the Clayton Act); see also 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (authorizing the Federal
Trade Commission to seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against potential violators
of the antitrust laws).
42. SIMONS & DELRAHIM, supra note 26, at 4.
43. See DC Appropriations—FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, tit. VI, § 630(a), 114 Stat.
2762, 2762A-108 (2000); § 18a(a)(2)(A) (codifying the amendments that made the adjustments
applicable to “each fiscal year beginning after September 30, 2004, in the same manner as
provided in section 19(a)(5) of this title to reflect the percentage change in the gross national
product for such fiscal year compared to the gross national product for the year ending September
30, 2003”).
44. Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 7369,
7369–70 (Mar. 4, 2019).
45. SIMONS & DELRAHIM, supra note 26, at 8.
46. Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 2017.
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variety, product quality, or innovation.”47 When applying the consumer
welfare standard, a court will find a merger as anticompetitive “if it
disrupts the competitive process and harms trading parties on the other
side of the market.”48 This Note recognizes that this standard has gained
broad bipartisan support over the past fifty years based on extensive
practical experience and thus is not advocating for its replacement in
antitrust law.49
A. Empirical Studies on Vertical Mergers
The overall consensus resulting from the two leading empirical
surveys conducted on vertical mergers is that the majority of them benefit
consumers;50 only a minority of them may be harmful to competition and
the public.51 The first survey, authored by a group of DOJ & FTC
economists, reviewed twenty-four papers published between 1984 and
2005, analyzing their observed empirical effects; the survey concluded
that no paper published in that period identified instances where vertical
mergers were likely to have harmed competition.52 The second survey
reviewed twenty-three papers relating to vertical mergers and concluded
that, as a result of these mergers, consumers benefit from higher quality
products and better service.53 In addition, a 2018 summary of eleven
papers in peer-reviewed journals that empirically analyzed the welfare
effects of vertical mergers in the United States since 2009 supports the
conclusions of the prior surveys.54 Some of the specific economic
benefits and harms derived from vertical mergers are reported below.

47. Id. at 2000; see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 10–11, 21–26, 66 (1978).
48. Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 2018.
49. See id. at 2020.
50. Wong-Ervin, supra note 8, at 3; see Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical
Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 663 (2007).
51. Elyse Dorsey et al., Consumer Welfare & the Rule of Law: The Case Against the New
Populist Antitrust Movement, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 861, 902 & n.243 (2020).
52. Wong-Ervin, supra note 8, at 3
53. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints:
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391, 391–409
(Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).
54. Glob. Antitrust Inst., Comment Letter on the Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings on
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (Sept. 6, 2018), https://gai.gmu.edu/
wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2018/09/GAI-Comment-on-Vertical-Mergers.pdf [https://perma.cc/
98BN-QDBF].
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B. A Brief Review of the Economic Benefits and Harms of
Vertical Mergers
In theory, as well as in the market, vertical mergers can present both
benefits and potential anticompetitive effects.55 A non-exhaustive list of
these effects is explored here. First, vertical mergers benefit the market
by improving innovation, lowering transaction costs,56 or reducing
production or distribution costs57 since firms at differing levels of
production must work together to design, produce, and distribute goods.58
Second, vertical mergers both allow for efficient allocations of risk59 and
incentivize asset specific investments60 “in situations where a firm needs
to invest in a specialized asset (and where market exchange is
difficult),”61 which benefits consumers by expanding output.62 Third,
vertical mergers reduce inventory costs,63 which again helps to expand
output.64 Fourth, vertical mergers may allow for increased innovation
thereby leading to positive externalities for consumers.65 Fifth, vertical
55. See Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 551, 551–54 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds.,
2015); see also Roger D. Blair et al., Analyzing Vertical Mergers: Accounting for the Unilateral
Effects Tradeoff and Thinking Holistically About Efficiencies, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 761, 763
& nn.8–9, 767 & nn. 28–29 (2020) (highlighting economic evidence from articles and the results
of empirical studies published over the last twenty years pointing to the procompetitive nature of
vertical mergers).
56. Specifically, transaction costs related to issues of specificity, uncertainty, and
complexity. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 775.
57. Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 720
(2017); Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347, 351
(1950).
58. Wong-Ervin, supra note 8, at 6.
59. Vertical mergers help mitigate and manage asymmetric risk between contracting firms,
where one is more risk averse to contracting than the other. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 775–76.
For example, a risk averse manufacturer may be unwilling to distribute its product using a
distributor; to avoid agency law problems from how its product gets marketed, the manufacturer
may decide to vertically integrate by merger. Id. at 776.
60. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 33, 46–47 (1984);
Blair et al., supra note 55, at 762.
61. Sokol, supra note 6, at 1366.
62. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 762.
63. For example, vertical mergers may facilitate “faster optimization and control over
inventory, and it also may reduce forecast bias . . . . [or] creat[e] a lean supply chain system.” Id.
at 779. The strength of this efficiency is limited if the merging firms do not have effective
management and coordination among different information technology infrastructures or if the
merged firm does not have a unified information technology infrastructure. Id. at 779–80.
64. Id. at 765.
65. See Sokol, supra note 6, at 1367 n.58 (presenting the possibility that consumers could
see efficiency gains even in market situations where consumers pay zero on one side of a platform
pre-merger for a good or service and continue to pay zero post-merger for the same good or
service). The caveat with this merger-related efficiency is that it occurs only if the merged firm
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mergers eliminate double marginalization, i.e., double markups in price
by separate firms each with market power at different levels in a supply
chain,66 and lead to the creation of a maverick, i.e., a firm that plays a
disruptive role in the market to the benefit of consumers.67 Finally,
vertical mergers allow for the merging firms to become a coordinated and
innovative merged firm as a result of the internal knowledge sharing and
spillover that can occur.68
For all its praise, however, some vertical mergers have the potential
to produce various anticompetitive effects. Notably, the work supporting
the following negative effects is mostly theoretical.69 Again, a nonexhaustive list is explored here. First, vertical mergers may lead to input
foreclosure in the market70 because the merged firm can disadvantage
rivals who rely on the input by acquiring the supplier of an important
output.71 In other words, a vertical merger “may diminish competition by
allowing the merged firm to profitably use its control of the related
(similar to agile startup firms) applies the acquired internal research and development knowledge
to its current and subsequent products or services. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 780–81.
66. “Elimination of double marginalization” (EDM) is a term that describes when a merged
firm is able “to eliminate a markup it would otherwise pay a supplier.” Blair et al., supra note 55,
at 762. Simply put, the merged firm eliminates double marginalization:
Double marginalization refers to the situation in which two different firms in the
same industry, but at different levels in the supply chain, each apply their own
markups (reflecting their own margins) in pricing their products. Those
“stacked” margins are both incorporated into the final price that consumers have
to pay for the end product. By vertically integrating two such firms into one, the
merged company is able to “shrink that total margin so there’s one instead of
two,” leading to lower prices for consumers.
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2018) (citations omitted),
aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Ordinarily in a competitive market, “[t]he price that a
downstream firm pays for an input supplied by an independent upstream firm may include a
markup over the upstream firm’s marginal cost.” VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at
5. If the upstream and downstream firm successfully merge, and the merged firm is able to supply
“itself with its own related product, it will have access to the input at cost” and the merger will
result in either an increase or decrease in downstream prices for the related product. Id.; see Blair
et al., supra note 55, at 768–73 (providing a thorough explanation of the economics behind EDM).
67. Wong-Ervin, supra note 8, at 3.
68. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 776–77. A related efficiency that results from vertical
mergers is knowledge transfers between the merging firms. Id. at 777–78.
69. See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J.
ECON. 345, 345 (1988); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 213–15 (1986).
70. Sokol, supra note 6, at 1367. Input foreclosure “includes price increases, cost increases,
and other disadvantages placed on downstream rivals.” Blair et al., supra note 55, at 790 n.134
(quoting Jonathan B. Baker et al., Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2019, at 12, 13).
71. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Vertical Mergers: Is It Time to Move the Ball?, ANTITRUST,
Summer 2019, at 6, 7.
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product to weaken or remove the competitive constraint from one or more
of its actual or potential rivals in the relevant market.”72 This includes
situations where the merging firms (and if successful in consummating
the merger, the merged firm) have the incentive and ability to raise its
prices, raise rivals’ costs,73 lower the quality of the related product,74
refuse to supply rivals with the related product altogether,75 or help to
make downstream collusion happen.76
A merged firm has the ability to begin engaging in unilateral
foreclosure or raising rivals’ costs if it can alter the terms by which it
provides a related product to its rivals, likely resulting in its rivals losing
significant market share or competing less aggressively for customers’
business.77 Likewise, a merged firm has the incentive to begin engaging
in unilateral foreclosure or raising rivals’ costs if it would likely find it
profitable to do either one because “it benefits significantly in the relevant
market when rivals lose sales or alter their behavior in response.”78
Second, vertical mergers can lead to consumer foreclosure where a
supplier disadvantages its rivals by acquiring a downstream distributor
and its customer base, depriving its rivals of scale and lessening their
ability to constrain the supplier’s market power.79 The foreclosure caused
72. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4. A relevant market is the “‘area of
effective competition’ within which the [merging firms] operate.” United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 649 (1957) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949)). A relevant market is composed of a product market and a geographical
market. Unites States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974); HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 8, 13. The relevant product market “identifies the product
and services with which the [merging firms’] products compete. Second, the ‘relevant
geographical market’ identifies the geographic area in which the [merging firms’] compete[] in
marketing its products or service.” FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 119 (D.D.C.)
(emphasis added), appeal dismissed, No. 04-5291, 04-7120, 2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
15, 2004) (per curiam).
73. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 786–87. One potential scenario where this can occur is
bargaining rounds between a merged firm (who has less to lose from a breakdown in negotiations)
and other firms (who have more to lose) on a mutually agreeable price. Id. at 786.
74. A related product is “a product or service that is supplied or controlled by the [merging
firms] and is positioned vertically or is complementary to the products and services in the relevant
market.” VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 3. Products that are positioned
complementary to each other are referred to as complements, which can be component goods that
make up a related product. Id. at 9. When the price of a complement falls, manufacturers make
more of the related product and demand more of the complement goods. See id.
75. But see Blair et al., supra note 55, at 788 (arguing that there is little support for this
assumption, but more support for vertical mergers “incentiviz[ing] the merged firm to offer less
favorable terms to unintegrated rivals”).
76. Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1975
(2018).
77. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Jacobson, supra note 71, at 7.
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by vertical mergers is a different way of raising rivals’ costs,80 which
makes the market inefficient. Third, vertical mergers may give a merged
firm access to competitively sensitive information about other trading
partners and allow it to act upon that information in a way that harms the
market.81 Finally, vertical mergers may lead to difficulty in potential rival
entry82 and information exchange,83 which describes situations where an
upstream firm84 acquires a distributor handling competing products, and
the merged firm may have increased opportunities and incentives to
collude with the distributor’s other customers by sharing promotional
plans of its products.85
C. A Survey of Vertical Merger Caselaw
Antitrust policy presumes that integration by vertical merger is
procompetitive,86 i.e., less likely to create competitive problems,87
because purely vertical mergers do not eliminate direct competition. This
presumption leads to cost-saving efficiencies for consumers from
reduced transaction costs and facilitates product design enhancements.88
Vertical mergers are benign, and thus unlikely to have an anticompetitive
effect, under two market situations: (1) when the “upstream and
downstream” markets are not concentrated,89 and (2) when the market is

80. Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527,
538 n.54 (2013).
81. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 792.
82. D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Dir., Bureau of Competition, Remarks at Credit Suisse 2018
Washington Perspectives Conference: Vertical Merger Enforcement at the FTC 4–5 (Jan. 10,
2018) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2018/01/vertical-mergerenforcement-ftc [https://perma.cc/J92M-TD8V]) (“[B]ut now we are interested in cases in which
the firms are most likely to enter each other’s market . . . . [when the market] makes it inherently
more likely or easier for the merging firms to enter each other’s markets, as compared to de novo
entry by another firm. We also look at entry facilitation . . . whether prior to the merger, one firm
had an incentive to sponsor entry, and absent the merger, that the firm would have partnered with
another company . . . .”); Salop, supra note 76, at 1969, 1975. The merged firm would accomplish
this by declining “to sell to or buy from a new entrant.” Blair et al., supra note 55, at 791.
83. Salop, supra note 76, at 1978.
84. “In describing a vertical relationship, a stage closer to final consumers (such as a
distributor, retailer, or finished goods manufacturer) is termed ‘downstream,’ and a stage further
from final consumers (such as a supplier, wholesaler, or input manufacturer) is termed
‘upstream.’” VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1 (emphasis added).
85. Jacobson, supra note 71, at 7.
86. See IVA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1000b, at 139 (3d ed. 2009).
87. BORK, supra note 47, at 226–27.
88. Jacobson, supra note 71, at 8.
89. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 86, ¶ 1032a, at 234. Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp explain:
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competitive.90 That being said, vertical mergers are discouraged because
they arguably create a second-level monopoly, which would make the
merging firms’ rivals more resistant to competitive entry and less likely
to innovate.91
When compared to horizontal mergers, vertical mergers are
conceptually different. Antitrust law for horizontal mergers adheres to a
different set of merger guidelines92 than its vertical counterpart.93
Horizontal mergers are mergers between competitors in the same relevant
market.94 Horizontal mergers do not always create a monopoly market
share, although some plainly do,95 but may nonetheless result in an
overall substantial lowering of competition.96 Today, horizontal mergers
are proscribed if they “realistically threaten higher consumer prices.”97
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,98 the U.S. Supreme
Court articulated the following proposition that is now accepted as the
structural presumption in merger analysis99:

[O]ne set of circumstances where vertical mergers can be presumptively
condemned . . . . requires (1) that both markets are highly concentrated; (2) each
market independently has significant entry barriers; and (3) insufficient
unintegrated capacity exists at the B level to support efficient entry or operation
at the A level.
Absent any one of those factors, a vertical merger cannot cause significant
foreclosure of existing firms, increase significantly barriers to entry that already
exist, or significantly raise the costs of existing rivals.
Id.
90. See Sokol, supra note 6, at 1363 n.25 (“[F]oreclosure has no anticompetitive effect
whatsoever in competitive markets . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 86, at 159)).
91. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 608 (discussing this idea of a second-level monopoly).
92. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 1.
93. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1 (“These Vertical Merger Guidelines
outline the principal analytical techniques, practices, and enforcement policies of . . . (the
‘Agencies’) with respect to a range of transactions often described as vertical mergers and
acquisitions.” (emphasis added)).
94. Sullivan, supra note 23, at 408; see supra note 72.
95. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 310 (1975).
96. Id. at 302.
97. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 379 (2016). In
simple terms, the competitive difference between horizontal mergers and their vertical
counterparts is that with horizontal mergers “competitors generally have a mutual interest in
raising prices (which hurts consumers), [whereas] vertically [merged] firms generally have a
mutual interest in lowering prices (which helps consumers).” Salinger, supra note 55, at 552.
98. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
99. Sullivan, supra note 23, at 411.
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[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have
such anticompetitive effects.100
The structural presumption articulated in Philadelphia National Bank
is, arguably, a presumption based solely on economic theory. 101 When
read in light of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Baker
Hughes Inc.,102 a wrinkle to the approach emerges:
By showing that a transaction will lead to undue
concentration . . . the government establishes a presumption
that the transaction will substantially lessen competition.
The burden of producing evidence to rebut this presumption
then shifts to the defendant. If the defendant successfully
rebuts the presumption, the burden of producing additional
evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government,
and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which
remains with the government at all times.103
Specifically, Baker Hughes articulates a rebuttable presumption that
is “divorced from the specific probative value of market concentration
evidence.”104 When used to analyze the anticompetitive effect of
proposed vertical mergers, this burden-shifting framework is interpreted
to reflect the fact that vertical mergers do not increase market
concentration.105
100. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
101. See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 411.
102. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
103. Id. at 982–83 (citations omitted).
104. Sullivan, supra note 23, at 411. Market concentration is a method for assessing the risk
of consumer harms, like high prices, by analyzing the amount of market share that a merging
entity will control after a merger takes place. Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 2019;
Keyte, supra note 5, at 22. In antitrust cases, market concentration is defined either “in terms of
product or in terms of geographic locus of competition.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1962). For horizontal mergers, it is generally agreed that a sufficiently large
increase in market concentration is probative of likely anticompetitive harm for horizontal
mergers; thus, measuring market concentration is one way of judging the risk that a proposed
horizontal merger will be anticompetitive. See Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of
Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 277 & nn.45–46
(2015) (noting a number of economic studies which support some form of anticompetitive-effect
inference from sufficient market concentration evidence).
105. See Wong-Ervin, supra note 8, at 7. Market concentration evidence may be used by
enforcement agencies (along with measures of market shares) in vertical merger cases; however,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

214

[Vol. 73

D. United States v. AT&T, Inc.: What Was Old Is New Again
AT&T, Inc. is significant for various reasons. It is the first litigated
vertical merger challenge in forty years.106 Although AT&T, Inc. did not
break new legal ground, it expanded the Baker Hughes burden-shifting
framework to vertical mergers.107 In brief, vertical merger cases are
analogous to seeing an antitrust unicorn, and the parties involved in
AT&T, Inc. are current industry powerhouses.108 Indeed, AT&T, Inc. may
have the unintended effect of signaling to firms that their proposed
mergers will survive because the DOJ or FTC is weak in its ability to
bring a major case against the firms109 under a rule of reason approach.110
In AT&T, Inc., the U.S. Government challenged the proposed merger
between AT&T, Inc., a “large downstream purchaser and distributor of
video content,” and Time Warner, a “creator and supplier of popular
video content,” on three grounds.111 The Government’s main contention
was that the merger would harm competition in the video programming
and distribution industry, which operates in a three-stage chain of
production.112 The Government’s first argument was that the challenged
merger would enable Time Warner to charge rival distributors and
consumers higher prices for its content because of its post-merger

they are used “in conjunction with other reasonably available and reliable evidence for the
ultimate purpose of determining whether a merger may substantially lessen competition.”
VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 3–4. Further, while the Agencies have established
that they will not rely on certain market concentration thresholds as “screens for or indicators of
competitive effects” from vertical mergers, “high concentration in the relevant market may
provide evidence about the likelihood, durability, or scope of anticompetitive effects in that
relevant market.” Id. at 4; see HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 19 (listing the
market concentration thresholds that the Agencies will not rely on for vertical mergers).
106. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 764, 813.
107. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 190–91 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916
F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see Sokol, supra note 6, at 1364–65.
108. Sokol, supra note 6, at 1366.
109. See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1055, 1084–85 (2010) (noting how judicial decisions may have chilled DOJ merger
challenges in court).
110. Steven Salop, Professor, Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr., Presentation at the Federal Trade
Commission’s Public Hearing on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century:
Vertical Mergers 13, 16, 30–31 (Nov. 1, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/events-calendar/ftc-hearing-5-competition-consumer-protection-21st-century
[https://
perma.cc/SQ5P-CZYN]).
111. 310 F. Supp. 3d at 194; see also Sokol, supra note 6, at 1364–66 (providing an overview
of the DOJ’s three arguments at the district court level).
112. See AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1033, 1035. For an explanation of the three-step chain of
production at issue in this case and the relevance of affiliate fees and negotiations, see id. at 1033–
34.
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relationship with AT&T.113 The district court found that the Government
had not met its burden of production114 because its argument was
“speculative, based on unproven assumptions, or unsupported—or even
contradicted—by the Government’s own evidence.”115
The Government’s second argument was that the challenged merger
would substantially lessen competition by “creating an increased risk that
the merged firm will act, either unilaterally or in coordination
with . . . [sellers] to thwart the rise” of new entrants.116 On this argument,
the district court found that the Government merely presented a
“theoretical ‘possibility’ of coordination,” failed to acknowledge that it
would be unprofitable for the merged firm to engage in coordination, and
ignored the fact that the merged firm would have a great advantage by
not coordinating activities with its rivals.117 The Government’s third
argument was that the merged firm could harm competition by preventing
AT&T’s rival distributors from using a relevant product118 (the HBO
rights) as a promotional tool to attract and retain customers;119 the
Government alleged that this would foreclose the merging firm’s
competitors “from access to a potential source of supply, or from access
on competitive terms.”120 On this argument, the district court rejected the
Government’s theory because the Government failed to prove that

113. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 194, 204. The Government alleged that the proposed
merger was likely to increase Time Warner’s bargaining leverage in affiliate negotiations with
rival distributors. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1035. The Government attempted to show that the
merged firm would have an incentive to charge higher prices to its affiliates and pass those higher
prices onto consumers. Id. at 1036. Indeed, the Government’s trial expert testified that the
proposed merger could cause an annual fee increase of $587 million for rival distributors to license
Time Warner’s content, with an annual net increase of $286 million in costs passed on to
consumers in 2016 and increases in subsequent years. Id.
114. A burden of production is the burden of “producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge,
of a particular fact in issue. . . . The burden of producing evidence on an issue means the liability
to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if evidence on the issue has not been
produced.” KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (Robert P. Mosteller ed.,
8th ed. 2020). “A party who has the burden of production on an issue must introduce sufficient
evidence to enable the trier of fact to find in his or her favor on that issue or else the court, as a
matter of law, will decide the issue in favor of the opposing party.” JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.3510 (7th ed. 2008). Even if the government proffers
sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of production, that does not mean that it will “necessarily
prevail on the issue . . . . [since] the party with the burden of persuasion on an issue must convince
the trier of fact that it is more probable than not that the facts are as that party contends; otherwise
the issue must be decided for the opposing party.” Id. § 12.3520.
115. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029.
116. Id. at 194.
117. Id. at 246–48.
118. See supra note 74.
119. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 194.
120. Id. at 250.
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marketplace substitutes for HBO were “inferior, inadequate, or more
costly.”121
Subsequently, the Government appealed the district court’s denial of
its request for a permanent injunction,122 challenging the district court’s
findings on the Government’s failure to prove its increased leverage
theory.123 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings,124
leading to the conclusion that the Government failed to meet its burden
of persuasion for various reasons. Upon review of the record, the circuit
court found that the Government had failed to overcome the merging
firm’s rebuttal evidence; the Government did not present a comparable
data analysis that showed a “statistically significant effect on . . . prices”
related to prior vertical mergers in the industry.125 Instead, the
Government’s real-world evidence, made up of executive statements
made in regulatory findings and expert opinions and models, were
“subject to deficiencies identified by AT&T’s experts, some of which
[the Government’s expert] conceded.”126 Thus, the circuit court
acknowledged that although the district court accepted the Government’s
economic theory generally, the district court rejected the model’s specific
prediction in light of the credited rebuttal evidence.127 Indeed, the circuit
court found that the district court “reached a fact-specific conclusion
based on real-world evidence” that it would be costly for the merged firm
to engage in foreclosure (in the form of a long-term blackout).128
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that the
Government’s supporting evidence had inaccurately predicted the
proposed merger’s probable effect on competition129 and accepted
AT&T’s explanation using real-world evidence of data from prior
vertical mergers in the video programming and distribution industry that
showed “no significant results.”130 In spite of the Government’s evidence
that arguably showed more than a “mere possibility” of competitive

121. Id. at 250–51.
122. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1032, 1047.
125. Id. at 1031.
126. Id. at 1039.
127. Id.
128. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1040–41 (D.C. Cir. 2019). For more
information on foreclosure as a theory of harm, see supra note 78 and accompanying text. For a
detailed discussion on blackouts in affiliate negotiations, see United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F.
Supp. 3d 161, 172 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029. The circuit court also recognized the
importance the district court gave to the merged firm’s “‘irrevocable’ offer of arbitration
agreements with a no-blackout guarantee.” AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1041.
129. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1037, 1046.
130. Id. at 1037–38.
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harm,131 the circuit court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the
Government had failed to show that the proposed merger was likely to
substantially lessen competition to a “reasonable probability.”132
Although several amici had urged the circuit court to speak
definitively on the proper legal standard for evaluating vertical
mergers,133 neither party challenged the legal standard used by the district
court, leaving the circuit court without the need to opine.134 The circuit
court, however, acknowledged the lack of precedent on vertical mergers,
noting that the relevant merger guidelines were enacted over thirty years
ago.135 This case is symptomatic of a larger trend in antitrust law cases
(not just in vertical merger cases) reviewed under the rule of reason: from
1977–1999, courts disposed of 89% of burden-shifting cases at the first
stage on the ground that there was no anticompetitive effect;136 from
1999–2009, courts disposed of 97% of burden-shifting cases at the first
stage on similar grounds.137
Ten years after the above survey was conducted, the D.C. Circuit in
AT&T, Inc. affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Government’s
anticompetitive argument.138 The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in AT&T, Inc.
131. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962) (quoting S. REP. NO.
81-1775, at 6 (1950)).
132. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 n.39); see id. at
1040–41.
133. Id. at 1037.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES ¶ 4.0, at 24 (1984),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [https://perma.cc/6B
GY-AS8A]. But see VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1 n.1 (withdrawing the 1984
Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines to reflect the FTC and DOJ’s current enforcement policies).
136. Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 1265, 1269, 1275 [hereinafter Carrier, Real Rule]. Carrier reviewed a total of 495 rule of
reason cases during this time period. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical
Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 827 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier,
Empirical Update]. For 118 cases involving challenges to vertical restraints (mergers), the courts
found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect in 105 of them.
Carrier, Real Rule, supra, at 1275.
137. Carrier, Empirical Update, supra note 136, at 828–30. Carrier reviewed a total of 738
antitrust cases where the courts applied a rule of reason analysis, but this figure did not include
cases where courts denied summary judgment motions or motions to dismiss and did not include
grants or denials of preliminary injunctions unaccompanied by final findings. Id. at 828–29. Out
of the 738 cases, 222 cases all involved a court’s final determination using a rule of reason
analysis. Id. at 829. “Out of the 222 cases, 215 were resolved on the grounds that the plaintiff
[generally, the enforcement agencies] did not prove an anticompetitive effect.” Id. at 829. In 221
of 222 cases, the defendant (generally, the merging parties) won. Id. at 830.
138. 916 F.3d at 1033, 1037 (finding the district court’s factual determinations were not
“clearly erroneous” because the Government had not met its burden of establishing, “through
‘case-specific evidence,’ that the merger . . . at this time . . . is likely to substantially lessen
competition in the manner it predicts” (quoting United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161,
194 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029))).
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reveals antitrust law’s tendency to achieve inconsistent results if the
Baker Hughes burden-shifting framework is not refined to analyze a
proposed vertical merger.139 Perhaps the economic data supporting the
procompetitive effect of these challenged restraints (like mergers) in all
of these cases were unambiguous and sufficient to refute the
Government’s evidence of anticompetitive harm.140 More likely,
however, is that perhaps antitrust law can improve in the area of merger
analysis.
Courts reviewing vertical mergers today insist that factual findings of
competitive harm in vertical merger challenges be sufficient and
justified.141 Unfortunately, the lack of precedent in vertical merger
caselaw leaves more questions unanswered than resolved. Indeed, the
U.S. Supreme Court has not decided a vertical merger case since 1972,142
and a circuit court has not decided a vertical merger case since 1979.143
The last time a circuit court decided a private merger case was in 1987.144
Further, the last time a district court decided a private vertical merger case
was in 1997.145 Although horizontal mergers fall under a different set of
caselaw,146 courts (after AT&T, Inc.) will apply the Baker Hughes
139. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962) (holding that the
Government sustained its burden of proof and affirming the district court’s conclusion that the
“merger may tend to lessen competition substantially in the retail sale of . . . shoes”), and Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1972) (holding that General Motors’ asset
acquisition of one of the independent producers of spark plugs adversely affected competition),
with Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1236, 1246–47
(3d Cir. 1987) (holding that a merger between two methanol producers was not illegal because
the plaintiff (a rival competitor) failed to allege an antitrust injury and finding that the
anticompetitive effects of this merger, the plaintiff’s collateral loss of sales to the acquired
company resulting from the vertical aspects of the merger, was not a violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act because it amounted to “only a de minimis foreclosure”), and AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d
at 1037 (holding that the Government had not met its burden of persuasion).
140. The district court and the circuit court agreed that it did. See AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
3d at 226 (“I agree with defendants, for the most part, that the inputs and assumptions of Professor
Shapiro’s [one of the Government’s key experts’] model are not sufficiently grounded in the
evidence—a fact that ‘undermine[s]’ my ‘confidence in the reliability and factual credibility’ of
his projections.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 363
(D.C. Cir. 2017))); AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1036, 1038–39 (agreeing with the district court’s
finding that the Government’s presentation of Professor Shapiro’s expert opinion “on the likely
anticompetitive effect of the proposed merger” was not “supported by sufficient real-world
evidence” because the “expert opinion and model were subject to deficiencies identified by
AT&T’s experts”).
141. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 600–01.
142. See Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 562.
143. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 608.
144. See Alberta Gas Chems., 826 F.2d at 1236.
145. See HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1107, 1112
(S.D. Miss. 1997).
146. See Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100
IOWA L. REV. 2039, 2055 n.89 (2015).
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burden-shifting framework from horizontal mergers to vertical merger
cases.147 Based on the court’s finding that the Government was unable to
meet its initial burden and shift the burden to the merging firms,148 AT&T,
Inc. indicates a trend in vertical merger caselaw that subsequent vertical
merger challenges will result in consistent court approvals of challenged
vertical mergers.
This Note’s proposals will help clarify vertical merger enforcement
by providing two vital pieces that are currently missing from the Baker
Hughes burden-shifting framework149: (1) detailing the specific evidence
each party can present to satisfy their respective burdens and (2)
establishing a definite articulation of the government’s burden of
persuasion as satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence standard
(instead of described in general terms).
III. EXPLORING BURDEN-SHIFTING PRESUMPTIONS OUTSIDE OF
ANTITRUST LAW
Lessons from analogous burden-shifting presumptions outside of
antitrust law are examined below to help determine the evidentiary
standard that each party should be assigned in an injunctive relief
proceeding for vertical mergers.
A. Title VII Employment Discrimination Suits
Employment discrimination lawsuits filed under Title VII are
analyzed under a three-step production burden-shifting framework.150
The framework is as follows:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the
preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of
discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee’s rejection.” Third, should the defendant carry this
burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate

147. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Neither the
government nor the defendants challenge application of the burden-shifting framework in United
States v. Baker Hughes for horizontal mergers that the district court applied to consider the effect
of the proposed vertical merger . . . .” (citation omitted)).
148. Id. at 1037, 1047.
149. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
150. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981).
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reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons,
but were a pretext for discrimination.151
The plaintiff retains the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.”152 By
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff effectively
“creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employee.”153 “If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff’s
evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact
remains in the case.”154
If the burden shifts to the defendant, the objective “is to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff
was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.”155 By introducing admissible evidence, the
defendant clearly sets forth the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection and
“raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff . . . . The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to
justify a judgment for the defendant.”156 The Court explained:
If the defendant carries this burden of production, the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and
the . . . plaintiff . . . must have the opportunity to demonstrate
that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision. This burden now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the
victim of intentional discrimination.157
B. Moving for Judgment as a Matter of Law in Jury Trials
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial
and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on
that issue, the court may . . . grant a motion for judgment as
a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that,

151.
(1973)).
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id.
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981).
Id. at 255–56.
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under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated
only with a favorable finding on that issue.158
This procedural rule “allows a party to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence prior to submission of the case to the jury, and authorizes the
district court to grant such motions at the court’s discretion.”159 Although
the standard of judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the standard for
granting summary judgment,160 the court reviews all the evidence in the
record.161 For this motion to be granted after the verdict is rendered, the
court must find that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find as
it did or that the evidence was “so compelling that only one result could
follow.”162
The analysis here utilizes a burden-shifting framework involving
individual burdens of production assigned to both the moving and
nonmoving parties.163 Although the moving party presents evidence in
favor of its argument that the motion should be granted, the court first
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue to the
jury.164 At the initial stage, the burden has not shifted to the nonmovant,
who can rely on the legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence.165 In most cases, the burden shifts to the nonmovant if the court
decides that the moving party’s evidence is sufficient or substantial
enough that the jury might decide for the nonmovant.166 After comparing
the sufficiency and credibility of both evidentiary presentations,
including if the evidence involves the issues of witness credibility, the
court makes a decision either to grant or deny the motion.167
C. Moving for a Temporary Restraining Order
A cause of action for injunctive relief is a forward-looking action.168
The sole function of an injunction is to “forestall future violations.”169 To
make the case for injunctive relief, there must be “a real threat of future
violation or a contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue or
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
159. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 399 (2006).
160. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).
161. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
162. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.3, at 549 (5th ed. 2015).
163. Id. at 554.
164. Id. at 555–56.
165. Id. at 555.
166. Id. at 553.
167. Id. at 556.
168. United States v. Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952).
169. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5

222

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

recur . . . . Even where relief is mandatory in form, it is to undo existing
conditions, because otherwise they are likely to continue.”170 Because an
injunctive action is unrelated to punishment or past violations, a court’s
decision to issue an injunction does not prevent injured plaintiffs from
seeking future remedy for past violations either by indictment or through
an action for damages.171 Courts are skeptical of a defendant’s effort “to
defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repentance and reform,
especially when abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is
probability of resumption.”172
In civil cases, a court “may issue a temporary restraining
order . . . if . . . specific facts in an affidavit or verified compliant clearly
show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to
the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.”173
During a hearing where the party that obtained the temporary restraining
order moves the court to issue a preliminary injunction,174 “the party
seeking the injunction would bear the burden of demonstrating” four
factors that justify the preliminary injunctive relief.175 These factors
include: (1) that a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
(3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction
is in the public interest.176 In other words, the party seeking the
preliminary injunction has the burden to show that it is entitled to one—
the burden is not on the party opposing the injunction to show that the
moving party is not entitled to an injunction.177
Federal appellate courts have determined that the plaintiff must
“clearly carry the burden of persuasion.”178 Notably, Rule 65(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does not place upon the [non-moving]
party . . . the burden of coming forward and presenting its case against a
preliminary injunction.”179 By implication, the burdens of production and
persuasion fall on the shoulders of the party seeking injunctive relief.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A).
174. Id. 65(a)(2), (b)(3).
175. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415
U.S. 423, 441 (1974).
176. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
177. See Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 443.
178. United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1983); see Texas v. Seatrain
Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975).
179. Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 442.
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D. Resolving a Perceived Error in Applying the Baker Hughes
Framework
One statement in AT&T, Inc. is troubling: the circuit court suggested
that the district court, although reaching the correct conclusion to allow
the AT&T–Time Warner merger to proceed, applied the Baker Hughes
framework incorrectly at the first step. Much to the Author’s
consternation, the district court concluded “that the Government has
failed to clear the first hurdle of showing that the proposed merger is
likely to increase [the defendant’s] bargaining leverage in affiliate
negotiations.”180 This statement suggests that the district court in AT&T,
Inc. mischaracterized the government’s initial burden as a burden of
proof181 rather than as a burden of production. Baker Hughes is clear that
the government’s initial burden is not one of proof but rather of
production.182 The district court in AT&T, Inc. found that the
Government’s evidence at trial was insufficient to “clear the first
hurdle”183 after it “‘balance[d]’ whether the Government’s asserted
harms outweigh the merger’s conceded consumer benefits” and the
merging entities rebuttal evidence;184 consequently, it found that the
Government’s evidence had little to no probative value.185 Indeed, the
court rejected the Government’s economic theories and models186 in
support of the “real-world examples” and “real-world testimony” of
“various industry witnesses” that contradicted the Government’s
predicted findings.187
180. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 199 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d
1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The circuit court acknowledged that the district court undoubtably “made
some problematic statements” that the court could not ignore. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1038.
181. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 189 & n.16; see also Blair et al., supra note 55, at 821
(“[A]lthough the AT&T court applied the Baker Hughes burden-shifting framework, it stopped at
the first step after finding the plaintiff had failed to prove that the transaction would allow the
merging parties to raise rivals’ costs.”).
182. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (comparing its
“production-burden-shifting” framework to the analysis in employment discrimination lawsuits
under Title VII from Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–56
(1981)).
183. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 199.
184. Id. at 198.
185. Id. at 208, 212, 234, 245 n.53. Probative value is an evidentiary concept, defined as the
“degree to which one fact tends to make probable another posited fact.” Probative Value, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). It is a term that relates to an evidentiary presumption, which is
satisfied with sufficient evidence that “at a minimum, shifts the burden of producing evidence” to
the opposing party. BROUN ET AL., supra note 114, § 342, at 775. In the context of a vertical merger
challenge, where the government “proves the basis facts giving rise to a presumption [,e.g., that
the merger may substantially lessen competition], it will have satisfied its burden of producing
evidence with regard to the presumed fact.” Id. § 344, at 779.
186. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 199, 206–07, 219–22.
187. Id. at 203, 217, 222–26, 234–37, 240–41.
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The court’s reasoning would be correct if it had applied it at the final
step of the Baker Hughes framework, but not at the first step. A closer
analysis suggests that the district court expressed the government’s
burden of production at the first step in terms of its burden of proof.188
Clarification in vertical merger caselaw, relating to which burden has (or
has not) been met at each stage of the analysis and the reasons why, is
needed to avoid further confusion. Ultimately, the sufficiency of the
government’s evidence that is required to satisfy its initial burden of
production is not measured against the merging entities’ rebuttal evidence
for probative value. The district’s court’s finding that the government’s
evidence lacked probative value is misplaced at the first step of the Baker
Hughes framework because probative value is an evidentiary standard
describing how a party satisfies its burden of persuasion.189 All that Baker
Hughes requires of the government at the first step of the analysis is
sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of production,190 judged
independently from (not in conjunction with) the merging entities’
rebuttal evidence.191 It is only at the third step of the Baker Hughes
analysis where any court would be allowed to consider the government’s
“additional evidence” in light of the merging entities rebuttal evidence to
determine if the government has satisfied its “ultimate burden of
persuasion.”192
188. See id. at 204–05, 208.
189. The term probative value was adopted within the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which
provided that “where the facts upon which the presumption is based have ‘probative value’ the
burden of persuasion is assigned to the adversary; where there is no such probative value, the
presumption . . . dies when met by contrary proof.” See BROUN ET AL., supra note 114, § 344, at
784 (quoting UNIF. R. EVID. 14 (1953)). Use of this concept in vertical merger challenges opens
the door to confusion and inconsistency because different courts “could give different answers to
the question whether a particular presumption has probative value.” Id. Rather than using of this
term, courts reviewing vertical merger challenge should clearly identify that the government’s
ultimate burden of persuasion is satisfied by the preponderance of the evidence standard.
190. In other words, “To say that a party bears the burden of producing evidence is to say
she runs the risk of losing automatically . . . if she does not offer sufficient evidence to enable a
reasonable person to find in her favor.” 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 3.2, at 415 (4th ed. 2013).
191. BROUN ET AL., supra note 114, § 338, at 767, 769. Thus, at the first stage of the Baker
Hughes framework, like the standard for reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, to
determine “whether there is sufficient evidence” the court should “look only to the evidence and
reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of” the government and “may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949)).
192. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990). “The burden
of persuasion becomes a crucial factor only if the parties have sustained their burdens of
producing evidence . . . . If there is no jury and the judge is in doubt, the issue must be decided
against the party having the burden of persuasion.” BROUN ET AL., supra note 114, § 336, at 764
(emphasis added). Notably, the district court mentioned the Government failed to meet its burden
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CONSISTENT VERTICAL MERGER ENFORCEMENT:
REFINING BAKER HUGHES
Currently, there is no safe harbor for certain vertical mergers where
the merging firms have a share of less than 20% of the relevant market193
and where the related product194 is used in less than 20% of the relevant
market;195 in sum, there is no presumption of legality.196 However, this
Note advocates for including a presumption that some challenged
mergers are procompetitive based on the findings from economic and
empirical evidence.197
A. Addition of an Initial Procompetitive Presumption
Indeed, this initial presumption should apply at the outset of a
proceeding in instances where the merging firms can prove (during the
Hart-Scott-Rodino review process)198 that the effect of elimination of
of persuasion because if failed to prove that the “substantial lessening of competition will be
‘sufficiently probable and imminent.’” AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (quoting FTC v. Arch
Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115 (D.D.C. 2004)). The court in AT&T, Inc. incorrectly applied
the phrase as a standard to judge whether the Government met its burden of proof. This is because
the court’s use of the phrase in AT&T, Inc. expressly suggested that the government satisfies its
burden of persuasion in vertical merger challenges by demonstrating “that the substantial
lessening of competition will be ‘sufficiently probable and imminent’ to warrant relief” to the
exclusion of all other competition that may be substantially lessened. Id. (quoting Arch Coal, 329
F. Supp. 2d at 115). However, the phrase “sufficiently probable and imminent” is half of a quote
that the court in AT&T, Inc. used to describe the type of “loss of competition ‘which . . .’ is the
concern of § 7.” United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.22 (1974)
(quoting United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964)). The full quote reads,
“Moreover, the competition with which § 7 deals includes not only existing competition but that
which is sufficiently probable and imminent.” Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added).
Thus, in vertical merger challenges, the government satisfies its burden of persuasion by
demonstrating that a proposed vertical merger may substantially lessen direct competition or
competition which is sufficiently probable and imminent, not only and exclusively that which is
sufficiently probable and imminent.
193. See supra note 72.
194. Examples of a related product include an input, a means of distribution, or access to a
set of customers. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 3.
195. Statement of Joseph Simons, Chairman, Noah Joshua Phillips & Christine S. Wilson,
Comm’rs, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Regarding Joint Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Vertical Merger Guidelines (June 30, 2020) [hereinafter Statement of Simons],
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2020/06/statement-chairman-joseph-simons-commissionernoah-joshua-phillips [https://perma.cc/YGJ2-PBNJ].
196. During its argument in AT&T, Inc., the DOJ stated that “[t]here is no presumption in
the law that vertical mergers are ‘presumed procompetitive,’ or ‘presumptively efficient.’”
Proposed Conclusions of Law of the United States at 10, AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (No.
1:17-cv-02511-RJL) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/ file/1061066/download [https://perma.cc/2P43-482Q].
197. See Blair et al., supra note 55, at 767, 816; see also discussion supra Section II.A.
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)–(b).
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double marginalization (EDM)199 was a result of the challenged merger,
so long as the agencies can independently verify that EDM results from
the challenged merger.200
B. The Baker Hughes Burden-Shifting Framework
To reiterate, the Baker Hughes burden-shifting framework involves
three steps. The first step is modified due to the unavailability of market
concentration evidence when examining a vertical merger,201 and the
inclusion of a procompetitive presumption when the Agencies can
independently verify that EDM’s existence is the result of the challenged
merger. Thus, the government must satisfy its initial burden of
production202 by identifying the relevant market(s)203 and then making a
sufficient showing that the merger is likely to substantially lessen
competition in the relevant market(s),204 which leads to a presumption of
illegality, i.e., the proposed merger’s anticompetitive effect.205
The second step requires the merging firms to rebut the presumption
of illegality by producing evidence that shows that the government’s
prima facie case “inaccurately predicts the [merger’s] probable effects on
future competition”206 or “sufficiently discredit[s] the evidence
underlying the initial presumption” in the government’s favor.207 For the
third step, if the merging firms successfully rebut the presumption, then
the government is required to produce additional evidence showing the
merger’s probability of producing substantially lessened competition;
this burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion that remains
with the government at all times.208 This Note proposes that the only
burden of proof is on the government at this final stage of the burdenshifting framework and is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence
standard.209 Ultimately, the government’s case hinges on successfully
answering one question: “How may a vertical merger create a firm with
the ability and incentive to foreclose, in whole or in part, a rival from a
relevant market and cause net harm to consumers?”210
199. See supra note 66.
200. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 12.
201. See supra note 105.
202. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 114, § 342, at 774.
203. See supra note 72.
204. See United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
205. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
206. Anthem, 855 F.3d at 349 (quoting Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991).
207. Id.
208. See Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 983.
209. In effect, this Note argues that the government is not required to make a “clear showing”
that the challenged merger’s anticompetitive effects topple its procompetitive efficiencies, as did
the court in Baker Hughes. Id.
210. Statement of Simons, supra note 195, at 1.
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C. The Evidentiary Standards and Types of Evidence that Could Be
Presented
To begin, for the government to satisfy its initial burden of production,
it must make a “‘fact-specific’ showing that that the proposed merger is
‘likely to be anticompetitive,’”211 i.e., the government must present
sufficient evidence to a degree of a “reasonable probability,” not proof of
certain harm.212 Simply put, the government cannot make a theoretical
argument213 that a proposed merger may substantially lessen
competition214 in the relevant market.215 At this initial stage, a court
should find that the government has met its burden of production when it
proffers economic evidence that is sufficient, i.e., strong enough that
a reasonable person could draw from it the inference of the
existence of the particular fact to be proved [and is] . . . .
...
. . . not merely . . . evidence from which reasonable people
could draw the inference of the truth of the fact alleged, but
evidence from which (in the absence of evidence from the
adversary) reasonable people could not help but draw this
inference.216
Further, as in Title VII employment discrimination suits like Burdine,
which Baker Hughes is modeled after,217 the sufficient evidence standard
applies to both parties for each to satisfy their respective burdens of
production.
There are various ways for the government to support its initial burden
of production.218 First, the government can assert that the proposed
merger produces unilateral effects that diminish competition between one

211. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
212. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962).
213. See Keyte, supra note 5, at 21.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 127–28.
215. See United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
216. BROUN ET AL., supra note 114, § 338, at 767, 769.
217. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981); see also supra
note 182.
218. This second step of the Baker Hughes framework has been interpreted and expressed as
a burden of production. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir.
1990); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Baker Hughes’s interpretation
is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. American Express, 138 S. Ct.
2274, 2284 (2018), in the context of the rule of reason analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Jacobson, supra note 71, at 10.
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merging firm and its rivals that either trade with or could trade with it.219
When arguing that a vertical merger creates unilateral effects, the
government may present evidence of head-to-head competition between
one merging firm and rivals that trade with the other merging firm.220 The
government may also present alternative metrics, such as diversion ratios
or upward pricing pressure, to support its allegation of unilateral
effects.221
Indeed, the government is likely to allege that the challenged vertical
merger produces a combination of the three most common types of
unilateral effects: input foreclosure, raising rivals’ input costs, or
acquiring its downstream or upstream rivals’ competitively sensitive
information.222 For either of these allegations of anticompetitive harm,
the government is likely to allege that the merging firms have both the
incentive and ability to engage in these activities.223 To prove that the
merging firms have the ability to engage in input foreclosure or raise
rivals’ costs, the government may present evidence that the challenged
merger makes the merging firms more likely to force rivals out of the
219. Unilateral effects occur when a merger “eliminates competition between two merging
firms but does not alter the manner in which the other firms in the market compete” and “largely
depend on the extent of direct competition, or ‘diversion,’ between the merging firms.”
Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 2014. Thus, “[a] merger is likely to have unilateral
anticompetitive effect if the acquiring firm will have the incentive to raise prices or reduce quality
after the acquisition, independent of competitive responses from other firms.” United States v. H
& R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 81 (D.D.C. 2011). In other words, a merger may diminish
competition by enabling or encouraging post-merger coordinated interaction among firms in the
relevant market that harms consumers. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 24;
see VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 10. The focus of any court’s unilateral effects
analysis is “the relative degree of substitution between the merging firms’ output and the predicted
impact of the merger on the postmerger firm’s own prices.” Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note
17, at 2014 & n.85.
220. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 3–5.
221. For commentary on the use of diversion ratios and upward pricing pressure in merger
analysis based on unilateral effects, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:
From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 60–80 (2010). These metrics can
be used to complement or supplement the traditional metrics for measuring market shares and the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for measuring market concentration. Hovenkamp & Shapiro,
supra note 17, at 2000 n.12. HHI is widely used when evaluating the anticompetitive effects of
horizontal mergers, “measured as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in the
market.” Id.
222. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4 & nn.4 & 10. The concern with
these effects is that the merging firms could “probably use its supply of an input (the related
product) to weaken the competitive constraint it faces from rivals in the downstream market (the
relevant market) . . . . [and] raise barriers to entry.” Id. at 4 n.4. For more explanation on the
negative aspects of these effects, see supra Section II.B.
223. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4–5. Perhaps these requirements
are a response to the district court’s comment in AT&T, Inc. about the defendant not having “the
‘incentive’ or the ‘ability’ . . . to ‘lessen competition substantially.’” United States v. AT&T, Inc.,
310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 252 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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relevant market; deter rivals from innovating, entering, expanding, or
financing those activities; or pass on higher costs to consumers by
charging higher prices.224 It also may present evidence that the merging
firms’ rivals can readily switch “purchases to alternatives to the related
product,” but that the switch will have a meaningful effect on “the price,
quality, or availability of products or services in the relevant market.”225
Notably, the types of evidence that may be used to measure the firms’
rivals’ ability to switch to alternatives of the related product include the
types of evidence the Agencies use to evaluate customer switching when
implementing the hypothetical monopolist test.226

224. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4–5. Concerns with a merged firm
raising rivals’ costs are prominent when the firm has “unintegrated downstream customers and
when these customers sell products that are close substitutes for the merged firm’s own
downstream product and have limited comparable alternatives to purchasing inputs from the
merged firm.” Blair et al., supra note 55, at 787.
225. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 5.
226. Id. The enforcement agencies utilize the hypothetical monopolist test “to identify a set
of products that are reasonably interchangeable with a product sold by one of the merging firms.”
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 9. The test is also used to evaluate “whether
groups of products in candidate markets” are broad enough to constitute relevant markets. Id. at
8. Specifically, the test requires that
a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, that was
the only present and future seller of those products (“hypothetical monopolist”)
likely would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase
in price (“SSNIP”) on at least one product in the market, including at least one
product sold by one of the merging firms.
Id. at 9. In addressing customers’ likely responses to higher prices that result from horizontal (as
well as vertical mergers), the Agencies consider a non-exhaustive list of reasonably available and
reliable evidence that includes the following:
• how customers have shifted purchases in the past in response to relative
changes in price . . . ;
• information from buyers, including surveys, concerning how they would
respond to price changes;
• the conduct of industry participants . . . :
o [including] sellers’ business decisions . . . indicating sellers’
informed beliefs concerning how customers would substitute among
products in response to relative changes in price;
o ....
• objective information about product characteristics and the costs and delays of
switching products . . . ;
• ....
• evidence from other industry participants, such as sellers of complementary
products;
• . . . and

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

230

[Vol. 73

Further, to succeed in alleging that the merging firms have the
incentive to foreclose rivals or offer inferior terms for the related product,
the government may present evidence that the merging firms would likely
find it profitable to, and benefit significantly from, a reduction in actual
or potential competition with users of the related product in the relevant
market.227 Overall, the government’s presentation of these potential
anticompetitive effects must be consistent with the facts and
circumstances of the relevant market, linked to future market conditions,
and supported by contemporaneous business documents.228
Second, the government may allege the vertical merger’s “reasonable
probability”229 of raising barriers to market entry,230 or that new entrants
are required to engage in two-level entry.231 It may also present evidence
that the merging firms have an incentive to refuse to supply to a new
entrant because the entrant is more efficient than the merging firms.232
Third, the government can present actual evidence of substantial
lessening of competition observed in consummated vertical mergers,
direct comparisons based on experience, and evidence about the
disruptive role of a merging party.233 Fourth, the government may present
evidence that the merging firms (if the merger was approved) have the
incentive to raise rivals’ distribution costs due to a large amount of
diversion to the firms’ related product and a large number of sales
potentially lost to rival distributors, which will likely result in large
profits.234 Fifth, to show that the challenged merger may result in the
merging firms raising the price of complement goods,235 the government
may present qualitative evidence supporting why the firms would raise

• the influence of downstream competition faced by customers in their output
markets.
Id. at 11–12.
227. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 5.
228. See id.; Keyte, supra note 5, at 20. In other words, the government’s “econometric
modeling of any sort” must “‘fit’ with the facts (much like a Daubert review).” Keyte, supra note
5, at 25.
229. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962).
230. This situation occurs in oligopoly markets. Brief for 27 Antitrust Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 8, United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (No. 1:17-cv-2511), 2018 WL 5099063, at *6.
231. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 7–8; United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 82–84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
232. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 8.
233. See id. at 3. The sources of evidence may “include documents and statements of the
merging parties, their customers, and other industry participants and observers.” Id.
234. See id. at 8.
235. See supra note 74.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss1/5

32

Ossorio: Drawing the Line: Refining the Baker Hughes Burden-Shifting Frame

2021]

DRAWING THE LINE

231

the price of its related product for its customers that do not also buy the
firms’ complements for the related product.236
Sixth, the government may present evidence that the merging firms’
rivals would avoid doing business with them because the firms (as a result
of the consummated merger) would use the rivals’ sensitive business
information to lower the competitive value of procompetitive actions.237
Seventh, the government may prove that the proposed vertical merger
produces coordinated effects238 by showing that the relevant market
shows signs of vulnerability to coordinated conduct, and that a credible
basis exists on which to conclude that the merger may enhance that
vulnerability.239 Specifically, the government’s most important
presentation at the initial stage will likely be a combination of fact witness
testimony240 and business documents, with sound economic data and
mathematical models that complement, not contradict, the substance of
the government’s argument that the challenged vertical merger may
substantially lessen competition.
AT&T, Inc. hinted,241 and New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG242
affirmed, that courts view contemporaneous business documents and
testimony (or the lack thereof) from the key decision-makers of merging
firms as one of the most persuasive pieces of evidence in vertical merger

236. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 9.
237. Id. at 10.
238. Coordinated effects involve harm to consumers arising from coordination between the
merging firms and its remaining rivals. Id.; see HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24,
at 24–27 (explaining how the agencies evaluate post-merger coordinated effects and firm
interactions). Antitrust law as it relates to mergers “rests upon the theory that, where rivals are
few, firms will be able to coordinate their behavior, either by overt collusion or implicit
understanding in order to restrict output and achieve profits above competitive levels.” FTC v.
CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 60 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246
F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). A non-exhaustive list of evidence of market vulnerability
includes failed previous attempts at collusion in the relevant market, which suggests “successful
collusion was difficult pre-merger but not so difficult as to deter attempts, and a merger may tend
to make success more likely;” if each competitively important firm’s “significant competitive
initiatives can be promptly and confidently observed by that firm’s rivals;” if a firm’s “prospective
competitive reward from attracting customers away from its rivals will be significantly diminished
by likely responses of those rivals.” HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 25–26.
239. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 10; see also HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 24–27 (explaining that enforcement agencies seek to identify how
a merger might significantly weaken competitive incentives through an increase in the strength,
extent, or likelihood of coordinated conduct by looking at various scenarios that signal when a
market is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct).
240. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 187 (D.D.C. 2018) (mentioning
the Government’s twenty fact witnesses in that case), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
241. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1036.
242. 439 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
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challenges.243 Consequently, it is crucial for the government to define the
relevant market with precision to strategically limit the relevance of the
merging firms rebuttal evidence, which may be likely to rely less on
economic data and more on testimony from the merging firms’
executives.244 Industry retrospectives can be presented if “sufficiently
tied to the issues at hand.”245 Likewise, the government’s economic
theories must be linked to the merging firms’ business strategies to
support a reasonable inference that one post-merger consequence is that
objectively reasonable corporate executive and business manager
behavior is likely to produce anticompetitive effects.246
243. Keyte, supra note 5, at 20; Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 188–89, 244–45
(highlighting the fact that future vertical merger injunctive proceedings will likely turn on the
“weight” of witness testimony as a “guiding principle” for “the judge’s own skills and frontline
experience in weighing, predicting, and judging complex and often conflicting accounts of human
conduct,” to ultimately analyze “behavioral drives and motivational forces . . . . [that] can function
as a forecasting device, providing the Court substantial guidance about how the corporate officers
and companies involved in the case are likely to conduct themselves under particular market
conditions prevailing after a merger”). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Post-Chicago Economics
Ready for the Courtroom? A Response to Professor Brennan, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1113–
14 (2001) (“The [U.S. Supreme] Court’s continuing focus on motive, combined with its
preoccupation with motive in its first eighty years of antitrust decisionmaking, has the effect of
forcing lower court judges to consider motive in antitrust cases. Indeed, it tempts them to rely
primarily on motive in resolving the many disputes that are extraordinarily difficult to resolve
through application of . . . economic models. . . . This institutional characteristic of antitrust courts
creates a major obstacle to judicial application of . . . economics. A motive to harm a competitor
[or market competition] is irrelevant to the application of any . . . [economic] model. Courts will
go astray with great frequency if they become frustrated in their attempts to perform the daunting
task of applying a . . . model to a complicated market and instead rely on evidence of motive as
the basis to decide a case.”).
244. See, e.g., AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1041, 1045 (recounting that the district court credited
the testimonies of Turner Broadcasting’s president, Time Warner’s CEO, and an AT&T executive
categorizing the government’s theory of the merged firm’s post-merger foreclosure behavior (by
engaging in blackouts) as “too costly to risk,” a point that “undermine[d] the persuasiveness of
the government’s proof” (alteration in original) (quoting AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 219));
see also United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97, 148–49 (D. Del.) (“[T]he Court is more
persuaded by DOJ than by the Defendants . . . . largely due to the surprising lack of
credibility . . . of certain defense witnesses . . . . [I]t is the DOJ which, under the law, has the
obligation to prove its contention that the Sabre-Farelogix transaction will harm competition in a
relevant product and geographic market. DOJ failed. . . . Unlike Defendants’ evidentiary failings,
DOJ’s are dispositive.”), vacated as moot, No. 20-1767, 2020 WL 4915824 (3d Cir. July 20,
2020); Sabre Corp., 2020 WL 4915824, at *1 (“We also express no opinion on the merits of the
parties’ dispute before the District Court. . . . [T]his Order should not be construed as detracting
from the persuasive force of the District Court’s decision, should courts and litigants find its
reasoning persuasive.”).
245. Keyte, supra note 5, at 20. “Merger retrospectives often measure the performance of
merged firms against a set of similarly situated control firms.” Blair et al., supra note 55, at 772.
246. Contra Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 246. This inference is very relevant
to successfully challenge vertical mergers in dynamic markets. See id. at 241–44 (explaining the
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For the Baker Hughes burden-shifting presumption to be more
effective, the government’s argument should involve a fact-specific
presentation to the court that sufficiently presents the probable
anticompetitive effects of a vertical merger. Use of real-world economic
data from relevant markets, such as diversion ratios or upward pricing
pressure to show the coordinated effects of the challenged merger, will
be essential to shift the burden to the merging firms. Indeed, “antitrust
theory and speculation cannot trump facts.”247 Further, the government’s
presentation of the merged firms executives should not be filled with
“generic statements that vertical integration ‘can’ allow an entity to gain
an unfair advantage over rivals.”248 By presenting these specific types of
evidence, the government will be able to answer the court’s implied
question to overcome its initial burden: Can the government point to realworld evidence of past vertical mergers that actually resulted in
anticompetitive effects so that the court can reasonably infer this merger
will likely substantially lessen competition in the relevant market?
The government’s presentation of real-world data of the proposed
vertical merger’s “reasonable probability” of anticompetitive effects will
avoid the risk of a reviewing court interpreting its argument as
speculative. By presenting a direct measure of the strength of the
government’s prima facie case connected to the relevant market, a
reviewing court can weigh and determine, at the conclusion of the second
step of the Baker Hughes framework, whether the evidence offered by
the merging firms is enough to rebut the government’s prima facie
case.249 The government cannot tread lightly past the significance of its
initial showing because it sets the tone for the rest of the case. If the
government were to present a purely theoretical argument relating to the
challenged merger’s potential for anticompetitive harm, as the court
perceived the Government’s argument in AT&T, Inc.,250 then the

dynamics of the relevant market and the unique features of dynamic markets in general); see also
AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 176 n.6 (explaining the importance of industry dynamics in the
court’s decision).
247. FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 116 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 2004 WL
2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004). If a reviewing court finds that the government shows a
reasonable likelihood of coordinated effects by a preponderance of the evidence, it is not required
to reach the issue of unilateral effects. FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 67 (D.D.C.
2009).
248. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1042.
249. See FTC v. RAG-Stiftung, 436 F. Supp. 3d 278, 286–87, 298–99 (D.D.C. 2020)
(critiquing the FTC’s failure to define a relevant market in a proposed horizontal merger between
two North American suppliers of hydrogen peroxide).
250. See AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1046 (“[T]he government had not shown at the first level
that the merger was likely to lead to any price increases for consumers”); see also AT&T, Inc.,
310 F. Supp. 3d at 246 (“[T]he Government has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to show
more than a theoretical ‘possibility’ of coordination.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5

234

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

government is unlikely to succeed.251
For the second step, the merging firms may satisfy their burden of
production252 by either producing evidence that shows that the
government’s prima facie case “inaccurately predicts the relevant
[merger’s] probable effect on future competition”253 or sufficiently
“discrediting the [evidence] underlying the initial presumption in the
government’s favor.”254 The merging firms should satisfy their burden of
production under the sufficient evidence standard.255 Even if some may
argue this is unfair to the government because the merging firms stand to
profit more from the court’s approval, it should be noted that a burden of
production based on the sufficient evidence standard in this context is a
double-edged sword for the merging firms. Although the firms benefit
from the standard because “[c]ertainly less of a showing is required from
defendants to rebut a less-than-compelling prima facie case,”256 “the
more compelling the [government’s] prima facie case, the more evidence
the defendant must present to rebut it successfully.”257 As a result, the
merging firms’ “evidence should trump the [initial] presumption when
the evidence is more reliable than the presumption, and the presumption
should rule when the evidence is less reliable.”258 At this step, the
reliability of the firms’ evidence that is required to rebut the initial
presumption in the government’s favor “depends on the relative
probabilities of error of each.”259
This Note does not suggest imposing a burden of proof for the
merging firms, e.g., a clear and convincing standard,260 because that is
251. RAG-Stiftung, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 311 (“[E]valuating the persuasiveness of the additional
evidence offered by [the merging firms] in rebuttal, and by the [government] in support of its
ultimate . . . [burden of persuasion], becomes all but impossible. Some of that evidence might be
relevant (and to some degree) . . . and some might not. The Court has little way of sorting all that
out . . . .”).
252. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
253. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Baker
Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991).
254. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991.
255. See id. at 989 (mentioning that the court was “satisfied that the district court required
the defendants to produce sufficient evidence”).
256. FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 129 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 2004 WL
2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004).
257. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991.
258. Salop, supra note 104, at 292. “With a weaker anticompetitive presumption, evidence
at trial that the merger is beneficial is more likely to be able to overcome the . . . presumption.”
Id. at 293. Consequently, the “more compelling the [government’s] prima facie case, the more
evidence the defendant must present to rebut it successfully.” FTC v. RAG-Stiftung, 436 F. Supp.
3d 278, 311 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991).
259. Salop, supra note 104, at 294–95 (providing a mathematical explanation for this
proposition).
260. This type of standard relates to evidence “indicating that the thing to be proved is highly
probable or reasonably certain.” Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss1/5

36

Ossorio: Drawing the Line: Refining the Baker Hughes Burden-Shifting Frame

2021]

DRAWING THE LINE

235

analogous to the “clear[] showing”261 rebuttal standard that was rejected
in Baker Hughes262 and is also legally distinct from what is required to
satisfy a burden of production.263 Requiring a clear and convincing
standard on the merging firms would place a burden on them that is
“unduly onerous . . . . A defendant required to produce evidence ‘clearly’
disproving future anticompetitive effects must essentially persuade the
trier of fact on the ultimate issue in the case—whether a transaction is
likely to lessen competition substantially.”264
There are various kinds of rebuttal evidence the merging firms can
present to meet their burden of production. First, they may present a
successful efficiency defense,265 i.e., that the proposed merger’s
cognizable efficiencies266 would likely be sufficient to reverse the
merger’s potential harm to consumers.267 Whether the court will credit
the merger-induced decrease in downstream prices resulting from EDM
as a procompetitive efficiency depends on the merging firms satisfying
various fact-specific inquiries.268 For example, the firms may use
economic models that quantify their gains in the relevant market and, by
way of comparison, show that any gains are unlikely to outweigh any
losses from reduced sales of the related product.269 Indeed, the merging
firms may prove that they are unable to engage in input foreclosure or
261. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
262. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 989.
263. See supra Section III.D.
264. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991. “[W]hen the presumption becomes weaker, the burden
of production on the defendant required to rebut the presumption should fall accordingly.” Salop,
supra note 104, at 293.
265. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that
although the U.S. Supreme Court “has not sanctioned the use of the efficiencies defense in a
section 7 case, the trend among lower courts is to recognize the defense.” (citation omitted));
VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 11 (stating that efficiency clams will be evaluated
using the approach found in § 10 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines); HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 29–31.
266. For successful efficiency defenses, enforcement agencies will only credit mergerspecific efficiencies: those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and
unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of the proposed merger or another means having
comparable anticompetitive effects. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 30.
Within merger-specific efficiencies there is a subgroup called cognizable efficiencies: verified
merger-specific efficiencies that do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.
Id.; VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 11. Enforcement agencies will not challenge
a merger “if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is [not
likely] to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.” VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
2, at 11; HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 30 & n.14.
267. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 30. For more information on how
enforcement agencies conduct this analysis, see id. at 31.
268. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 5.
269. Id. Or the merging firms may show that its price responses are similar to those of nonmerging firms. Id. at 6.
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raise rivals’ costs as a result of the merger by presenting evidence that
“rivals could readily switch purchases to alternatives to the related
product, including self-supply, without any meaningful effect on the
price, quality, or availability of products or services in the relevant
market.”270 To accomplish this, the merging firms may produce evidence
that non-merging firms in the relevant market are “able to reposition their
products to offer close substitutes for the products offered by the merging
firms.”271
Further, to prove that they do not have the incentive to foreclose rivals
or offer inferior terms for the related product as a result of the merger, the
merging firms may present quantitative evidence that they “would not
benefit from a reduction in actual or potential competition with users of
the related product in the relevant market.”272 To show the merging firms’
lack of incentive to raise the price of a related product for their rivals, the
firms may offer evidence that presents an alternative cause for the
resulting reduction in competition,273 e.g., that the reduction is due to the
higher quality of the merging firms’ related product, not a price increase.
Similarly, to show a lack of incentive to raise rivals’ costs, the firms may
present evidence showing they will not use their leverage to negotiate
increased wholesale prices for the firms’ supply of the related product
from rival retailers.274
Second, the firms may present evidence of the absence of significant
entry barriers in the relevant market,275 a lack of a need to require new
entrants to go through a two-level entry into the relevant market,276 or the
lack of an incentive to refuse to supply to a new entrant because the
entrant is less efficient than the merging firms.277 Third, the firms may
produce evidence that shows either a lack of pre-merger competition or
continued intense post-merger market competition.278 Fourth, to counter
270. Id. at 5.
271. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 22.
272. VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 5. In the case of foreclosure, they may
also prove that their “gains in the relevant market [will] likely [not] outweigh any losses from
reduced sales of the related product.” Id. Indeed, the merging firms may be able to combat the
accusation that they will profit from foreclosing rivals or offering inferior terms for the related
product by present quantitative evidence that they will not benefit “significantly in the relevant
market when rivals lose sales or alter their behavior in response to the foreclosure or to the inferior
terms.” Id.
273. See id. at 6.
274. See id. at 7.
275. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The
existence and significance of barriers to entry are frequently, of course, crucial considerations in
a rebuttal analysis. In the absence of significant barriers, a company probably cannot maintain
supra-competitive pricing for any length of time.”).
276. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 7–8.
277. See id. at 8.
278. See Salop, supra note 104, at 270.
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allegations that the challenged merger may result in the merging firms
raising rivals’ distribution costs, the firms may present evidence that
suggests no incentive to raise the retail price for their product due to a
lack of diversion to the firms’ related product, as well as a de minimis
amount of sales lost to rival distributors.279
Fifth, to counter allegations that the challenged merger may result in
the merging firms raising the price of complement goods, the firms may
present qualitative evidence supporting why they would not raise the
price of their related product for their customers that do not also buy the
firms’ complements for the related product.280 Sixth, to counter
allegations that the challenged merger may cause the merging firms to
use a rival’s competitively sensitive information to moderate its
competitive response to that rival’s actions, the firms may present
evidence of scenarios where they are unlikely to preempt or act quickly
in response to a rival’s procompetitive business actions.281 Seventh, to
counter allegations that the challenged merger may result in coordinated
effects,282 the merging firms may either present evidence that the market
is less vulnerable to coordinated conduct283 or discredit the credibility of
the Agencies’ basis to conclude that the vertical merger may enhance that
vulnerability.284 Eighth and finally, the firms can rely on the testimony of
credible business managers and corporate executives that the challenged

279. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 8.
280. See id. at 9; supra note 74.
281. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 10. Or the firm may identify
situations where rivals are unlikely to refrain from doing business with it because there is almost
no risk that the merging firms will use rivals’ competitively sensitive business information. See
id.
282. The Agencies are more likely “to challenge a [vertical] merger on the basis of
coordinated effects when the relevant market shows signs of vulnerability to coordinated conduct,
and the Agencies have a credible basis . . . to conclude that the merger may enhance that
vulnerability.” Id.
283. For example, the firms could present evidence that the market is not as vulnerable as
the government proffers because the merging firm is or would (as a result of the merger) be the
maverick firm that “plays or would play an important role in preventing or limiting
anticompetitive coordination in the relevant market.” Id. A non-exhaustive list of defenses
includes a lack of transparency regarding the identities of the firms serving particular customers;
irregular monitoring by suppliers of another’s prices or customers; if the merged firm’s
“prospective competitive reward from attracting customers away from its rivals will be
significantly [increased] by likely responses of those rivals,” e.g., if the firm’s rivals produce a
substitute good of inferior quality as compared to the firm’s related product. See HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 26.
284. See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 10. The merging firm may present
qualitative or quantitative evidence that it stands less to gain from successful coordination with
other rival participants. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at 26.
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merger will produce procompetitive benefits and help it to continue a
successful business strategy on a greater scale.285
For step three, the government should be assigned a preponderance of
the evidence standard of proof to satisfy its final burden of producing
additional evidence of anticompetitive effects, as an elevated evidentiary
standard here would be misguided. Here is where this Note breaks new
ground from Baker Hughes, which categorized the sufficient evidence
standard as satisfying the government’s final burden.286 Although the
district court in AT&T, Inc. mentioned that the preponderance of the
evidence standard will satisfy the government’s burden of proof for a
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, this Note argues that vertical
merger caselaw should affirmatively establish that this is the standard that
applies to the government for it to satisfy the burden of persuasion in
vertical merger challenges.287
285. See New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 234, 246 (S.D.N.Y.
2020).
286. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Because
the government did not produce sufficient evidence to overcome this successful rebuttal, the
district court concluded that ‘it is not likely that the acquisition will substantially lessen
competition in the United States either immediately or [in the] long-term.’ The government has
given us no reason to reverse that conclusion.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Baker
Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 12 (D.D.C. 1990))).
287. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 189 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The
Government ‘has the ultimate burden of proving a Section 7 violation by a preponderance of the
evidence.’” (quoting United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 49 (D.D.C. 2011))),
aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Although for some this may be crystal clear in articulating
the standard for the government to meet its burden of persuasion in a vertical merger challenge,
consider the distinguishable nature of these precedents. H & R Block involved a horizontal merger
between H & R Block and TaxACT, the second and third most popular distributors of do-ityourself tax preparation products, that was enjoined because the defendants were unable to rebut
the Government’s presentation of the merger’s potential anticompetitive effects. 833 F. Supp. 2d
at 43–44, 92. In H & R Block, the district court cited to another case that mentioned “The United
States has the ultimate burden of proving a Section 7 violation by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. at 49 (quoting United States v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180
(D.D.C. 2001)). That case, Sungard Data, involved a horizontal merger challenge between two
major computer disaster recovery providers (SunGard, Inc. and Comdisco, Inc.), both of whom
offered information technology services that allowed businesses to restore their computer
applications if a disaster or power outage caused primary data centers to become unavailable. 172
F. Supp. 2d at 173–75, 177–78. In Sungard Data, because the Government failed to prove that
there were “a substantial number of customers [among] whom there are no competitive
alternatives” in a narrowly defined relevant product market, the court was unable to conclude that,
if the challenged merger were approved, a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to
impose an increase in price. Id. at 191–93. Although the court in Sungard Data declared that the
government satisfies its burden of persuasion by meeting the preponderance burden of proof
standard, that rule is unsupported without a citation to any federal caselaw precedent or federal
statute. See id. at 180. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit’s articulation of the
applicable standard in Concord Boat Corp. is close, stating that “[a]ntitrust plaintiffs must prove
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In terms of degree, a preponderance of the evidence standard would
require the government to produce additional evidence of greater
reliability than compared to merging firms.288 This is neither illogical nor
irrational: by requiring the government to produce additional evidence
that disproves a vertical merger’s potential procompetitive effects, it
“must essentially persuade the trier of fact on the ultimate issue in the
case—whether a transaction is likely to lessen competition
substantially.”289 The burden of proof standard should be introduced for
the first and only time at this point in the analysis since it equates to what
Baker Hughes describes as the government’s burden of production
merging with its ultimate burden of persuasion290 at this final step.
Indeed, the government should conclude its argument by presenting
evidence that is more plausible and persuasive than the merging firms’

an antitrust violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1058 (8th Cir. 2000); cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
379 & n.7, 390 (1983) (explaining the benefits of using the preponderance of the evidence
standard in civil cases, including for private plaintiffs suing for fraudulent misrepresentations and
omissions in a registration statement under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934). However,
again the facts are distinguishable from vertical merger challenges: the plaintiff boat builders in
Concord Boat Corp. alleged that the market leader in stern drive engine manufacturing established
a monopoly in the stern drive engine market, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 207
F.3d at 1044–45. Rather than borrow the burden of proof standard from cases that are clearly
distinguishable (mostly in fact and somewhat in law), should the courts not clearly establish the
standard necessary for the government to meet the ultimate burden of persuasion in a vertical
merger challenge?
288. One definition of the preponderance of the evidence standard is “that evidence
preponderates when it is more convincing to the trier [of fact] than the opposing evidence.” BROUN
ET AL., supra note 114, § 339, at 770. Preponderance is said to
describe a state of proof in which the “weight of the evidence” favors (or does
not favor) the conclusion in question, and preponderance is often said to describe
a state of proof that persuades the factfinders that the points in question are “more
probably so than not” . . . .
Preponderance is not a comparative standard . . . The question is not whether
plaintiff’s case is better than defendant’s, but whether the evidence makes the
points that the plaintiff must prove more probably true than not.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 190, at 425. In other words, proof by a preponderance
means “proof which leads the [trier of fact] to find that the existence of the contested fact is more
probable than its nonexistence. Thus the preponderance of evidence becomes the trier’s belief in
the preponderance of probability.” BROUN ET AL., supra note 114, § 339, at 770; see also Steuer,
supra note 20, at 173 (arguing that the law should encompass harm that is “as likely as not”).
289. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991. “[W]hen the presumption becomes weaker, the burden
of production on the defendant required to rebut the presumption should fall accordingly.” Salop,
supra note 104, at 293.
290. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 983.
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rebuttal evidence.291 At this final step, the government’s strategy should
consist of three prongs. First, the government should show that the
anticompetitive effect of raising rivals’ costs likely exceeds (in terms of
magnitude) the procompetitive benefit(s) of EDM.292 In other words, the
government should prove that the merger is likely to “produce a net
unilateral anticompetitive effect[,] . . . specifically, . . . that the
anticompetitive effect of RRC [raising rivals’ costs] likely exceeds the
procompetitive benefit of EDM.”293 Admittedly, there are “few clear
answers” for questions related to the best way for the government to
conduct its analysis.294 Merger simulation is one avenue that the
government can use to analyze the effect of EDM on the size of raising
rivals’ costs.295 That being said, the government should avoid the mistake
it made in AT&T, Inc. of populating its model with improper inputs and
faulty assumptions.296 Alternatively, the merging firms could be tasked
with presenting the magnitude of the challenged merger’s procompetitive
effects at the rebuttal stage, whereas the government would only be
required to measure the magnitude of the merger’s harmful effects at this
final stage; the court will ultimately weigh them both and decide.297
291. “The burden of proof should generally be given to the party with the claim that is hardest
to believe. If the plaintiff’s claim is implausible, make him prove it. If a defense seems far-fetched,
make the defendant come forward with the evidence supporting it.” HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 146 (2005). The defendant’s rebuttal evidence may consist of a heavy
reliance on the merging firms’ executive and officer testimony. See, e.g., AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at
1036, 1038.
292. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 765, 798. Blair and colleagues refer to this as the “unilateral
effects tradeoff” and argue that EDM and raising rivals’ costs (RRC) are both “inherent, unilateral
competitive effects—two sides of the same coin—even if they do not necessarily share equal
magnitude.” Id. at 762, 764. This tradeoff occurs when the merged firm sells a related product at
a lower price than its rivals, causing “some substitution away from competing products—
including those made by rival downstream firms—reducing these firms’ demand for
inputs. . . . Consequently, EDM . . . affects the RRC incentive (by lowering the unintegrated
downstream firms’ demand for the input) . . . .” Id. at 794.
293. Id. at 765; see VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 5 (explaining that the
enforcement agencies will evaluate “the likely net effect on competition . . . to the merged firm’s
unilateral incentives”). Although Blair and colleagues argue that this should be proved in the first
step of the Baker Hughes framework, that is inconsistent with the framework’s structure since it
is at the third step that the government must satisfy its “ultimate burden of persuasion” that shows
the challenged merger’s “probability of substantially lessened competition.” Baker Hughes, 908
F.2d at 983; see Blair et al., supra note 55, at 815, 817.
294. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 796.
295. Id.
296. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 199, 234–35, 237–38 (D.D.C.
2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029; AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1036–39, 1046–47.
297. Blair et al., supra note 55, at 797. This alternative has the potential to become a
legitimate enforcement mechanism if Congress were to amend the HSR Act to require or obligate
the merging firms to calculate and present the magnitude of the proposed merger’s efficiencies,
including EDM, during the Pre-Merger Review process. To combat instances of merging firms’
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Second, the government should present fact testimony that shows
more than just that the merging firms considered the possibility that the
challenged merger “might create opportunities to charge higher prices or
otherwise decrease competition.”298 Likewise, the government’s
evidence should emphasize the unreliability of the merging firms’
executive or business manager testimony for arguably being one-sided
and self-interested in the outcome of the merger.299 Third, the
government’s economic theories and models should be connected to
observed “patterns of conduct business managers manifest that could
serve as persuasive predictors of whether or not commercial firms are
likely to engage in anticompetitive actions . . . under particular market
conditions.”300 The list of behaviors includes:
noncompliance with this new requirement, or scenarios where the reported magnitude of the
merger’s efficiencies turns out to be false or misleading, this Note proposes that Congress amend
the laws currently in place to grant the DOJ and FTC the ability to file a separate cause of action
for fraud, similar to § 11(a) lawsuits under the Securities Act of 1933 for “any part of the
registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). The addition of this cause of
action should correspond to a different civil penalty than the penalties currently in place. See 15
U.S.C. § 18a(g). The primary benefit and rationale behind this Note’s proposal is that, like in a
§ 11 securities law antifraud claim, the agencies “need not prove that the [defendant] acted with
any intent to deceive or defraud.” Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension
Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1323 (2015); see also STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES
REGULATION 580 (Saul Levmore et al. ed., 5th ed. 2019) (mentioning the other litigation benefits
that “scienter, reliance, and causation are not required elements of a § 11 cause of action”). To
achieve what this Note proposes here, vertical merger caselaw should adopt the two elements of
a § 11 securities law antifraud claim: (1) a showing of a material misstatement or omission and
(2) materiality. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra, at 579–80. The standard for materiality could be based
on the summary judgment standard for a material fact, e.g., “if it might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.” Hayes v. District of Columbia, 923 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48 (D.D.C.
2013) (quoting Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Or it can be based on other
understandings of the concept, e.g., “the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of
the alleged misrepresentation,” i.e., for the Agencies to choose to not challenge the merger, or
“[if] a reasonable man would attach importance to [it] in determining his choice of action in the
transaction.” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002–03 (2016)
(alterations in original) (quoting first 26 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12, at 549 (4th
ed. 2003); then RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538, at 80 (1976)).
298. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); see
AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 210 (“[E]vidence indicating defendants’ recognition that it could
be possible to act in accordance with the Government’s theories of harm is a far cry from evidence
that the merged company is likely to do so (much less succeed in generating anticompetitive harms
as a result).”).
299. See AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 1045 (recounting that the district court “dismissed the
suggestion that testimony from the Time Warner executives should be discounted as potentially
biased due to self-interest”).
300. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 244. For an explanation of the promise (and
potential disadvantages) of new economic bargaining models to vertical merger analysis, see
Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun, Use and Abuse of Bargaining Models in Antitrust, 68 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1055, 1069–70, 1092–96 (2020).
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[M]anifested personal and commercial ambition and
aggressiveness by company executives in pursuit of business
goals; concerns over the individual’s and the business’s
reputation in the industry; responsiveness to professional
and corporate peer pressure; strength of character brought to
bear upon company policies and operations; level of
commitment to business objectives and resourcefulness and
creativity in securing and managing the means to carry them
out; impulse to prevail in competitive settings and to
exercise will power directed to that end; motivation to
achieve marketing targets surpassing competitors;
inducement to strive harder impelled by the prospect of
promotion and rise of standing within a corporation or
industry; resort to disruptive or contrarian ways to gain
competitive ends and demonstrable success in doing so; and
patterns of past conduct and duration and consistency of
openly known identification with and adherence to a
recognized professional or business culture.301
The combination of the government’s fact testimony, economic
models and theories, and identified behaviors should persuade the court
that the merged firms’ post-merger pursuit of anticompetitive strategies
is not an irrational “commercial about-face,”302 but rather a “rational”
business strategy in the near or long term.303
CONCLUSION
This Note raised issues and presented novel proposals that will
hopefully lead to further dialogue, more analysis, and less speculation
among courts about how to analyze vertical mergers. It is the Author’s
hope that antitrust law will get closer to the ideal expressed and
envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Philadelphia National Bank—
to satisfy the “congressional objective embodied in § 7, to simplify the
test of illegality,”304 and to allow merging firms to “assess the legal
consequences of a merger with some confidence”305 and without “doing
violence” to this stated objective.306

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 244.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
Id. at 362.
Id.
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